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Abstract 
We use the longitudinal nature of the master file of the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics in Canada for the period 1993-99 to estimate the employ-
ment impacts for older workers of the large number (24) of minimum wage 
increases that have occurred across the different provincial jurisdictions over 
that period Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the minimum wage increases have 
positive impacts on the employment of older workers compared with the nega-
tive impacts that are commonly estimated for youths in Canada. The results are 
robust across various comparison groups and measures of the minimum wage 
increases. Reasons for this unusual finding are discussed 
1. Introduction 
The literature on estimating minimum wage impacts is extensive.! The focus 
of these studies almost invariably has been on youths. This is understandable 
given that youths tend to be at the lower end of the wage distribution, and 
hence are most likely to be affected by minimum wages. To our knowledge, 
there are no studies that focus on the impact on older workers. This lack of 
evidence for older workers may be understandable in the past, when there 
were few older workers in the workforce, and their typical pattern was to 
work often at blue-collar jobs until they retire and then to completely retire. 
Few such workers would likely have wages that were at or near the minimum. 
The new world of work, however, is vastly different. Older workers con-
stitute a larger portion of the workforce, and this is expected to grow into the 
future. For example, in the 25 EU member countries, the share of older 
workers age 55-64 is expected to increase from 10 per cent in 2003 to 18 per 
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cent by 2050 (Carone 2005: 63-7). In the USA, the share of older workers age 
55 and over will increase from 11.9 per cent in 1994 to 15.6 per cent in 2004, 
to 21.2 per cent as soon as 2014 (Tossi 2005). In Canada, the share of older 
workers age 55 and over in the workforce is expected to grow from around 14 
per cent in 2005 to around 20 per cent as soon as 2021 (Martel et al. 2007). 
Calculations based on United Nations (2002) data indicate that the share of 
those age 50-64 in the labour force is expected to grow over the period 
between 1980 and 2020 from 16.4 to 26.7 per cent in the EU, from 15.7 to 22 
per cent in the USA, and from 14.8 to 24.7 per cent in Canada. This growing 
share of older workers in the workforce reflects a number of factors. The 
population itself is ageing, as the large baby-boom population matures and 
lives longer, and the share of younger workers declines as fertility rates drop. 
The older population is also more likely to continue to work in the labour 
market, as the trend towards earlier retirement has reversed itself in recent 
years as a result of a number of factors: the shift from blue-collar work 
to white-collar work, the increase in non-standard and flexible worktime 
arrangements, the dissipation of mandatory retirement and a growing 
emphasis on combating age discrimination, more job opportunities associ-
ated with the growing labour shortages, and the complementarities between 
husbands working longer and their spouses who are more likely to be 
employed. 
As part of the process of working more, older workers are phasing into 
retirement utilizing bridge jobs that pay lower wages than their former main 
job. Increasingly, they are also returning to the labour force from retirement, 
often in service jobs and non-standard employment, such as part-time work 
and limited-term contracts (Gomez and Gunderson 2005). In these circum-
stances, older workers are more likely to be working at jobs where pay is low, 
and, therefore, more likely to be subject to minimum wages. 
In such circumstances, the implications of minimum wages for older 
workers are taking on increased practical and policy importance and will 
likely do so even more in the future. The purpose of this article is to begin to 
fill the gap that exists in the literature with respect to the impact of minimum 
wages on older workers. To our knowledge, this is the first study that focuses 
on older workers. Our empirical methodology is laid out in the next section. 
This is followed by a discussion of our data and the unique strengths of 
Canadian data for testing minimum wage impacts. Our empirical results are 
then discussed, as is their sensitivity to a wide range of specifications. Since 
our results are unusual and possibly unexpected - minimum wages are 
associated with increases in the employment of older workers compared with 
decreases in the employment of youths - our concluding section spends 
considerable time discussing plausible reasons for our results. 
2. Empirical methodology 
Our empirical methodology follows that of the previous analysis in Campo-
lieti et al. (2005a) for youths, thereby also facilitating comparisons of the 
effects on older workers compared to youths. Our estimates are based on the 
'at-risk' methodology that utilizes longitudinal data to compare employ-
ment transition probabilities of workers affected by minimum wage increases 
with comparison groups not affected by minimum wage increases. Essen-
tially, the probability of being employed in the subsequent year is estimated 
based on individuals as the unit of observation, with the key explanatory 
variable being whether an individual was in the treatment group of being 'at 
risk' of being affected by a minimum wage increase compared with a com-
parison group that was not at 'risk'. The 'at-risk' treatment group is identified 
as workers whose wage fell between the old minimum wage and the new 
minimum wage in a jurisdiction and time period where the minimum wage 
was increased. The comparison group is composed of workers of similar 
wages but whose wages were not affected by a minimum wage increase.3 
Our analysis models only transitions out of employment and not from 
non-employment to employment since we do not have wage data on the 
non-employed. 
We use probit analysis to estimate the probability of an individual being 
employed in period t, given that they were employed in period t - 1 as 
Pr(E/r = llEL = 1) = f(aMINWAGE/r +Xit-I{3+T,o+R;qJ+l4t) (1) 
where E/r = 1 if individual i from province j is employed at time t, and 0 if 
they are not employed in time period t, MINWAGE/r = 1 if individual i in 
province j at time t - 1 is in the 'at-risk' treatment group in that their wage 
falls between the old minimum wage and the new minimum wage when 
there is an increase in the minimum wage in province j at time t, 
and MINW A GE/r = 0 if the individual is not affected by a minimum wage 
increase. Xit-I is a vector of controls for observable characteristics for 
individual i at time t - 1, T t is a set of time dummies, Ri is a set of region 
dummies, and Uit is a residual. Since the employment transition function is 
conditional upon being employed in period t - I, persons not employed in 
period t - 1 are excluded, but persons in higher wage employment in period 
t - I are included and will form part of some of the comparison groups where 
wages will not be affected by a minimum wage increase. The MINWAGE 
variable captures the effects of minimum wage increases on the probability 
that the at-risk group will be employed in the subsequent time period com-
pared with the comparison group who did not experience a minimum wage 
increase. Ifminimum wage increases have their theoretically expected adverse 
employment effect, then the coefficient a on the minimum wage variable 
should be negative. 
We use a range of coinparison groups to test the sensitivity of the results to 
the inclusion of persons in the control group whose wage is very close (termed 
the 'tight' comparison group) to the minimum wage in their jurisdiction that 
did not have a minimum wage increase, ranging up to include persons whose 
wage was not so close to the minimum wage in their jurisdiction (termed the 
'broader' comparison groups). Persons in the 'tighter' comparison groups are 
more likely to be similar to those in the treatment group, since their wages are 
close to the minimum wage in their jurisdiction so that if their jurisdiction 
had raised its minimum wage, they likely would have been affected. Since 
we are dealing only with older workers, however, these sample sizes can be 
small (as discussed later). As illustrated subsequently, the sample sizes are 
increased by expanding to broader comparison groups whose wages are 
further away from the minimum wage in their jurisdiction. But this comes at 
the expense of including persons who are less likely to be affected by a 
minimum wage increase if it did occur in their jurisdiction, because the wage 
of some will be further away from their minimum wage. Higher-wage 
workers, for example, are likely to be different in terms· of unobserved 
characteristics that give them more employment stability. This likely 
overestimates - and hence provides an upper bound to - the minimum 
wage impact. 
Given this trade-off, we utilize a number of comparison groups. Our 
tightest low-wage comparison group is those in a jurisdiction that did not 
have a minimum wage increase but whose wage fell within the range of the 
minimum wage in their jurisdiction and $0.25 (Canadian dollars or about 
£0.12 British pounds) above their minimum wage. Since $0.25 is the modal 
minimum wage increase that occurred over our time period, they likely would 
have been affected by a typical minimum wage increase that occurred over 
that period. At the high-wage end of the spectrum, our 'broadest' comparison 
group consists of all persons with a wage above the minimum wage in their 
province but who did not have a minimum wage increase. 
While workers in our broad comparison group have greater employment 
stability than workers affected by minimum wages and hence are likely to 
provide an upper-bound estimate of the minimum wage impact, our tight 
comparison group is likely to have less employment stability and hence likely 
to provide a lower-bound estimate. This is so because our tightest compari-
son group of $0.25 is based on mimicking the typical or modal minimum 
wage increase that occurred. As indicated in Table 1, however, there were 
larger minimum wage increases, ranging from $0.40 to $1.00 over a year. As 
such, the tightest comparison group would not be reflective of similar persons 
in provinces that did not increase their minimum wage. Since their wage is 
lower than such persons, they are likely to have disproportionate employ-
ment instability and hence underestimate the minimum wage impact. 
Since the tightest comparison group of $0.25 is likely to underestimate the 
minimum wage impact, and the broadest comparison group of all wages is 
likely to overestimate the minimum wage impact, we prefer a comparison 
group whose wage lies between their existing minimum wage and $0.50, $0.75 
or $1.00 above that wage on the grounds that this will expand the number of 
observations in the comparison group but restrict it to those whose hypo-
thetical minimum wage increase would fall within the range of minimum 
wage increases that occurred over our data period. For that reason, they are 
most likely to have employment instability that is similar to the treatment 
groups of similar low-wage workers in the jurisdictions that experienced 
TABLE 1 
Minimum Wage Rates, Canada 1993-1999 
Jurisdiction Year 
1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 
1 September 1 April 
Newfoundland $4.75 $4.75 $4.75 $5.00 $5.25 $5.25 
Prince Edward 1 September 1 September 
Island $4.75 $4.75 $4.75 $5.15 $5.40 $5.40 
1 October 1 February 
Nova Scotia $5.15 $5.15 $5.15 $5.35 $5.50 $5.50 
1 January 
New Brunswick $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.25 $5.50 $5.50 
1 July 
$5.50 
1 October 1 October 1 October 1 October 1 October 1 October 
Quebec $5.85 $6.00 $6.45 $6.70 $6.80 $6.90 
1 January 1 January 
Ontario $6.35 $6.70 $6.85 $6.85 $6.85 $6.85 
1 July January 1 
Manitoba $5.00 $5.00 $5.25 $5.40 $5.40 $5.40 
1 December 
Saskatchewan $5.35 $5.35 $5.35 $5.60 $5.60 $5.60 
1 October 
Alberta $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.40 
1 April 1 March 1 April 
British $6.00 $6.00 $6.50 $7.00 $7.00 $7.15 
Columbia 1 October 
$7.00 
Source: Human Resources Development Canada minimum wage database: hourly minimum 
wages for adult workers. 
minimum wage increases. To determine the robustness of the results, we use 
a range of control groups between the tightest and broadest groups, specifi-
cally control groups with the following increments above their own minimum 
wage: $0.50, $0.75, $1.00, $1.50, $2.00, $2.50, $3.00, $3.50 and $4.00. Our 
single preferred comparison group would be $1.00, since that encompasses 
the actual range of minimum wage increases that occurred in our data. 
Following Currie and Fallick (1996), we also experiment with a lower-
bound, below the minimum wage to define the comparison group (but above 
the $2.00 that is the lower limit of our data). This expands the number of 
observations in the control group, but at the expense of including persons 
who are of questionable similarity to the treatment group on the grounds that 
if their wage was already below the legal minimum wage in their jurisdiction, 
it may not increase if they had a minimum wage increase. 
Our probit analysis includes a wide range of control variables, such as 
gender, marital status, education, union status, industry, immigrant status, 
visible minority status, finn size, the provincial unemployment rate for prime 
age males (25-54), and region and year-specific dummy variables. The region 
and year dummy variables are included to control for the effect of unmea-
sured factors that are correlated with region and time. 
The at-risk methodology does not consider the magnitudes of the wage 
increases induced by minimum wages, only that a minimum wage increase 
occurred. To capture the effect of the magnitude of the wage change, we 
replace the minimum wage indicator of equation (1) with a variable labelled 
GAP defined as the magnitude of the increase in the individuals' wage nec-
essary to bring it to the new minimum wage if the individuals were affected by 
a minimum wage increase, and 0 if they were not affected. 
The GAP measure, however, may reflect within-group heterogeneity to the 
extent that individuals with a large gap may have unobserved characteristics 
that give rise to employment instability. To account for this, we construct a 
wage gap measure for all individuals. For the treatment group, the gap is 
defined as before - the wage adjustment necessary to bring them up to the 
new minimum wage. For the comparison groups, the gap is the hypothetical 
wage adjustment necessary to bring them up to the minimum wage bound for 
that particular comparison group. Including this measure for both groups 
essentially controls for within-group heterogeneity. To capture the additional 
effect of the magnitude of the minimum wage increase for the treatment 
group, we interact the gap measure with a dummy variable indicating that the 
observation is from a treatment jurisdiction that experienced a minimum 
wage increase, labelling this the gap variant. 
3. Data 
Our empirical work is based on the Master Files of the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID) collected by Statistics Canada.4 Since SLID is a 
longitudinal dataset, it enables estimating the employment transition prob-
abilities outlined previously. We utilize the first wave of SLID, which pro-
vides longitudinal data from 1993 to 1999. That time period encompasses the 
effect of a recession in the early part of the 1990s, as well as the economic 
expansion of the latter part of the 1990s. Given our focus on older workers, 
we restrict our analysis to workers age 50 and over. As in Campolieti et al. 
(2005a), we also limit our data to individuals with the following characteris-
tic: wages between the minimum wage in their jurisdiction and $50 per hour, 
since wages outside this range might reflect measurement errors; those who 
did not move between provinces during the year, since movers could not be 
linked to a minimum wage change in a particular jurisdiction; individuals not 
in the Yukon or Northwest territories, since individuals were nor surveyed 
for those jurisdictions; and individuals with one job so as to avoid compli-
cations associated with tracing the employment changes of multiple job 
holders. 
Our employment dependent variable is coded 1 if the individual is 
employed in January of the current year and was also employed in January of 
the previous year, 0 if otherwise, since SLID collects information on the 
survey respondents in January. 
Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation in minimum wages (24 
increases) that have occurred both over time and across jurisdictions. The 
Canadian data is internationally recognized as ideal for estimating minimum 
wage impacts, since minimum wage are under provincial jurisdiction, and 
this gives rise to variation in minimum wages both across jurisdictions and 
over time (Hamermesh 2002: 716, 717). This is in contrast to countries with 
a uniform national minimum wage such as the USA, where minimum wage 
changes occur infrequently, and identification tends to come from state 'top-
ups', differences in coverage, or the slow erosion of the real value of the 
minimum wage as its 'real' value falls relative to the average wage of the state. 
The minimum wage increases ranged from $0.10 to $1.00, with the modal 
increase of $0.25 occurring seven times, and with the mean increase of $0.28 
being close to the modal value. The mean increase of $0.28 is a 5 per cent 
increase over the average minimum wage of $5.59 over our data period. 
There are 5,695 individuals in our sample based on the broadest definition of 
the control group, and 156 based on the 'tight' control group of a $0.25 
bound above the minimum wage in provinces that did not experience a 
minimum wage increase. In all cases, there are 61 observations in the treat-
ment group affected by minimum wage increases, raising the risk that it will 
not be possible to detect impacts from such a small group that is affected. In 
spite of this, as outlined subsequently, fairly substantial and significant effects 
are generally found. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics (average characteristics) for older 
workers in the treatment group of minimum wage jobs, as well as for three 
control groups: the tightest low-wage comparison group of those in a juris-
diction that did not have a minimum wage increase but whose wage fell 
within the range of the minimum wage in their jurisdiction and $0.25 above 
their minimum wage; the 'broadest' comparison group consists of all persons 
with a wage above the minimum wage in their province but who did not have 
a minimum wage increase; and our in-between preferred comparison group 
whose wage fell within the range of the minimum wage in their jurisdiction 
and $1.00 above their minimum wage, which encompasses the actual range of 
minimum wage increases that occurred in our data. 
As indicated, 80 per cent of minimum wage workers (column 1) were 
employed after their minimum wage increase. As expected, slightly lower 
proportions (77 per cent) were employed in the very low-wage or tight 
comparison group (column 2), reflecting their employment instability, 
higher proportions (87 per cent) were employed in the higher-wage control 
group (column 4), reflecting their employment stability, and the exact same 
proportion (80 per cent) were employed in our preferred comparison group 
(column 3) - providing further justification for the preferred comparison 
group. 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics (Means) for the Treatment Group (Minimum Wage Jobs) and Three 
Control Groups (MINW + 25, MINW + 100 and MINW + ALL) 
Variables Treatment Control group Control group Control group 
group (MINW+25) (MINW+l00) (MINW+ALL) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employed 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.87 
Male 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.53 
Married 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.83 
Education [<high school] 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.29 
High school diploma 0.34 0.28 0.23 0.22 
Non-university certificate 0.08 0.30 0.23 0.32 
University degree 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.17 
Union job 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.46 
Industry [service] 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.48 
Primary 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Manufacturing 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.16 
Construction 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Transportation 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08 
Trade 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.13 
Finance/real estate 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Industry unknown 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 
Immigrant 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.19 
Visible minority 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.04 
Firm size [<20 employees] 0.59 0.61 0.53 0.21 
20-99 employees 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.15 
1OQ...499 employees 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.14 
500 or more employees 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.48 
Firm size unknown 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Unemployment rate 11.5 8.92 9.14 9.02 
Year [1994] 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.09 
Year 1995 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Year 1996 0.23 0.05 0.08 0.07 
Year 1997 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Year 1998 0.25 0.40 0.36 0.40 
Year 1999 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.18 
Note: Excluded reference group in square brackets. 
MINW, minimum wage. 
As indicated in the first column, minimum wage jobs tend to be dispro-
portionately female, involving less education, and in the service and trade 
industries and in small firms. This also tends to be the case for our preferred 
comparison group, and less so for the low-wage comparison group and 
especially the higher-wage comparison groups, again adding further credence 
for the preferred comparison group. 
4. Results 
Full Regression, Minimum Wage and Controls 
Table 3 presents the full regression results for one of the 22 regressions (11 
comparison groups with wages above the minimum wage in their jurisdiction, 
and 11 with wages both above and below the minimum wage). Results for full 
TABLE 3 
Probit Estimates of Minimum Wages and Control Variables on the Employment 
Continuation Probability for Older Workers (50+), Based on Preferred Comparison Group of 
MINW + 100 Sample 
Variables Marginal effects t-statistic 
MINW+ 100 0.140 2.38 
Male 0.001 0.04 
Married 0.036 0.56 
Education [<high school] 
High school diploma -0.064 -1.17 
Non-university certificate -0.170 -2.09 
University degree -0.115 -0.97 
Union job 0.147 1.59 
Industry [service] 
Primary -0.105 -0.60 
Manufacturing -0.044 -0.45 
Trade -0.037 -0.77 
Industry unknown -0.179 -0.94 
Immigrant -0.043 -0.65 
Visible minority 0.042 0.52 
Firm size [less than 20 employees] 
20-99 employees -0.148 -1.99 
100-499 employees 0.061 0.86 
500 or more employees -0.019 -0.30 
Firm size unknown -0.055 -0.29 
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.03 
Year [1994] 
Year 1995 0.012 0.19 
Year 1996 -0.037 -0.56 
Year 1997 0.016 0.10 
Year 1998 0.046 0.53 
Year 1999 -0.085 -0.72 
Notes: t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by province. Excluded reference 
group in square brackets. 
MINW, minimum wage. 
regressions for the other 21 equations are available from the authors on 
request. This illustrative regression is based on our preferred comparison 
group of persons whose wage was within $1.00 above the minimum wage in 
their jurisdiction - the group whose wages were within the range of the 
actual minimum wage increases that occurred in our data. 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous (coded 1 if employed in the 
subsequent year, 0 if otherwise), probit estimation is utilized to confine 
predicted values to the unit interval, thereby giving a probability interpreta-
tion. These are converted to marginal effects so as to indicate the effect of 
minimum wages and the controls on the probability of being employed in a 
given year, conditional upon having been employed in the previous year. The 
probit results are similar to those based on OLS estimates of a linear prob-
ability function (available from the authors on request). 
As indicated in the first row, minimum wages have a statistically significant 
and positive effect on the employment of older workers. The coefficient of 
0.140 suggests that older workers whose wage was affected by a minimum 
wage increase were a statistically significant 14 percentage points more likely 
to be employed the next year compared with otherwise similar low-wage 
workers in provinces whose wages were not affected by a minimum wage 
increase. This is a substantial difference, perhaps reflecting a substitution 
from a relative large number of younger minimum wage workers into a small 
number of older minimum wage workers (as discussed subsequently). 
The results for the control variables are unsurprising, except for the nega-
tive effect of higher education on the probability of remaining employed in 
the subsequent period, albeit the impacts are generally statistically insig-
nificant. Since these are older workers, it is not clear that higher education 
would secure their employability. Union workers are more likely to remain 
employed, reflecting their employment security. Workers in the Atlantic 
provinces and Quebec are less likely to remain employed, reflecting the 
employment instability in those regions. 
Effects for Alternative Comparison Groups 
Table 4 summarizes the minimum wage effects for the 22 different regressions 
based on 11 comparison groups with wages above the minimum wage 
(labelled MINW+) in their jurisdiction, and 11 with wages both above and 
below the minimum wage (labelled MINW+ or -). 
Overall, the impacts are positive and generally statistically significant at 
conventional levels. That is, older workers whose wages would be affected by 
minimum wage increases were more likely to remain employed in the follow-
ing year compared with older workers in provinces whose wages were not 
affected by minimum wage increases. This is not only theoretically unex-
pected, but also at odds with even much of the 'new minimum wage litera-
ture' that sometimes found positive effects, but when positive, they were 
generally statistically insignificant. Clearly, our results for older workers are 
at odds with the results for youths as found in the general literature. 
Importantly, the positive effect for older workers is the opposite of the 
substantial negative effect on employment found for youths in the recent 
Canadian literatureS based on different datasets and methodologies. It is also 
the opposite of the negative effect for youths found in Campolieti et al. (2005a) 
based on the same time period, specification and dataset. Clearly, the positive 
employment effect is not a Canadian phenomenon; it is an older worker 
phenomenon. Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the conclusion. 
The positive employment effect is robust across all dimensions of the 
different specifications employed: the range of tight to broad comparison 
groups, and whether the comparison groups are based on those whose wages 
are above the minimum wage in their jurisdictions or both above and below 
that minimum wage. 
The magnitude of the positive effect does decline monotonically as broader 
comparison groups are used, and it does become statistically insignificant for 
broad comparison groups whose wages exceed the minimum wage in their 
jurisdiction by around $3.00 or more. This is expected, since these are less 
TABLE 4 
Pro bit Estimates of Marginal Effects of Minimum Wages on the Employment Continuation 
Probability for Workers Aged 50+: Various Control Groups (t-Statistic in Parentheses) 
Control groups Sample size 
MINW+25 156 
MINW+or-25 182 
MINW+50 199 
MINW+or-50 246 
MINW+75 279 
MINW+or-75 348 
MINW+ 100 326 
MINW + or - 100 389 
MINW+ 150 452 
MINW + or -150 533 
MINW+200 566 
MINW + or - 200 659 
MINW+250 650 
MINW + or - 250 759 
MINW+300 769 
MINW + or - 300 877 
MINW+350 912 
MINW + or - 350 1033 
MINW+400 1030 
MINW + or - 400 1145 
MINW+ALL 5578 
MINW + or - ALL 5695 
Notes: t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by province. 
MINW, minimum wage. 
Marginal effect 
0.250 
(2.30) 
0.227 
(2.06) 
0.208 
(2.03) 
0.193 
(1.82) 
0.151 
(2.01) 
0.150 
(1.92) 
0.140 
(2.38) 
0.134 
(2.14) 
0.135 
(2.10) 
0.129 
(1.95) 
0.118 
(1.79) 
0.115 
(1.73) 
0.107 
(1.57) 
0.110 
(1.70) 
0.098 
(1.36) 
0.100 
(1.46) 
0.095 
(1.29) 
0.097 
(1.37) 
0.088 
(1.30) 
0.090 
(1.34) 
0.042 
(0.63) 
0.044 
(0.67) 
preferred comparison groups because they disproportionately include higher 
wage persons who are likely to have greater employment stability than those 
who are affected by minimum wages. 
As discussed previously, the comparison group whose wage was between 
the minimum wage in their jurisdiction and $1.00 above that wage is our 
preferred comparison group, since it is within the range of actual minimum 
wage increases that occurred in our data. The coefficient of 0.140 on the 
minimum wage variable suggests that older workers whose wage was affected 
by a minimum wage increase were a statistically significant 14 percentage 
points more likely to be employed the next year compared with otherwise 
similar low-wage workers whose wages were not affected by a minimum wage 
increase. The magnitude was very similar (ranging from 0.13 to 0.15) for 
other reasonable comparison groups broadened to include persons whose 
wage also was up to $1.00 below the minimum in their jurisdiction 
(MINW + or - 100) or persons whose wage was up to $1.50 above or below 
the minimum in their jurisdiction (MINW + or - $1.50), or if it was nar-
rowed, to include only those whose wage was $0.75 above or below the 
minimum in their jurisdiction (MINW + or - 75). The statistical significance 
and the magnitude of the minimum wage impacts appear robust across 
alternative reasonable control groups. 
Gap and Gap Variant Estimates 
As indicated previously, we also use a gap measure of the magnitude of the 
increase in the individual's wage necessary to bring it to the minimum wage so 
as to exploit the considerable variation in the actual magnitude of the wage 
adjustment necessary to bring individuals up to the new minimum wage. We 
also use a gap variant that also controls for within-group heterogeneity. These 
results are presented in Table 5, along with those of the at-risk methodology 
for comparison purposes. We restrict the analysis to comparison groups with 
wages above the minimum wage in their jurisdiction that did not increase their 
minimum wage, since those below the minimum may reflect measurement 
error or non-compliance that would remain in non-compliance. 
The pattern of positive and generally statistically significant effects for 
reasonable control groups that prevailed in the at-risk methodology also 
prevailed in both the gap and gap variant methodology. The results for the 
gap methodology were also generally very close to those of the gap variant. 
The marginal effects for the gap estimates indicate the effect of a one-unit 
(i.e. $1.00) increase in wages from a minimum wage increase. Multiplying 
these marginal effects by the average minimum wage increase of $0.28 that 
occurred in our data yields the expected impact of the average minimum 
wage change on the probability of being employed. As indicated, these effects 
are very similar for the gap and gap variant methods (columns 4 and 6, 
respectively), and they are similar to the magnitudes for the at-risk method-
ology (column 2). Again the results appear robust, in this case across differ-
ent gap methodologies and between them and the at-risk methodology. 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
As a conservative statement, it certainly seems safe to say that minimum 
wage increases have not led to adverse employment effects for older workers 
TABLES 
Gap and Gap Variant Methods - Probit Estimates of Marginal Effects of Minimum Wages 
on the Employment Continuation Probability for Workers Aged 50+, Various Control 
Groups (t-Statistic in Parentheses) 
Control Sample size At-risk Gap Gap variant 
groups (1) methodology methodology 
Marginal Marginal Impact on Marginal Impact on 
effects effects employment effects employment 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MINW+25 156 0.250 0.846 0.237 0.921 0.258 
(2.30) (2.15) (2.39) 
MINW+50 199 0.208 0.924 0.259 0.923 0.258 
(2.03) (2.00) (1.89) 
MINW+75 279 0.151 0.758 0.212 0.747 0.209 
(2.01) (2.47) (2.10) 
MINW + 100 326 0.140 0.651 0.182 0.628 0.176 
(2.38) (2.87) (2.74) 
MINW+150 452 0.135 0.562 0.157 0.527 0.148 
(2.10) (2.22) (2.20) 
MINW + 200 566 0.118 0.516 0.144 0.449 0.126 
(1.79) (2.34) (2.04) 
MINW+250 650 0.107 0.445 0.125 0.396 0.111 
(1.57) (2.23) (2.10) 
MINW+300 769 0.098 0.390 0.109 0.309 0.087 
(1.36) (1.91) (1.59) 
MINW+350 912 0.095 0.382 0.107 0.306 0.086 
(1.29) (1.87) (1.66) 
MINW+400 1030 0.088 0.348 0.097 0.268 0.075 
(1.30) (1.93) (1.72) 
MINW + ALL 5578 0.042 0.203 0.057 0.147 0.041 
(0.63) (1.32) (1.01) 
Note: t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by province. 
MINW, minimum wage. 
as they have for youths in Canada. If anything, they are associated with 
positive employment effects. 
What could account for this theoretically unexpected positive and gener-
ally statistically significant impact of minimum wages on older workers? As 
indicated, it is at odds with even some of the new minimum wage literature 
for youths that often found zero impacts and occasionally even found posi-
tive impacts, but, when positive, they were generally statistically insignificant. 
It is also at odds with recent Canadian studies that find fairly substantial 
negative impacts for youths. In essence, any explanation of the positive 
impact for older workers must be consistent with why the opposite effect is 
found for youths in Canada. 
Employers may be more reluctant to layoff older workers than youths, but 
this explanation would be more consistent with a zero impact for older 
workers and a negative one for youths. The adverse employment effect is 
more likely to occur in the form of the counterfactual of slower employment 
growth rather than actual layoffs as well, and it is not obvious why this 
slower employment growth should not be as pronounced for older workers 
than for youths when both are subject to a minimum wage increase. 
Shock effects on employers or employees may explain the absence of an 
adverse employment effect. Employers and managers, for example, may be 
shocked by the cost increase of minimum wages to adopt more efficient 
practices in other areas. Employees who receive a minimum wage increase 
may be more motivated and committed, yielding cost saving in the form of 
reduced turnover - an efficiency wage response where the higher wages 
induce higher productivity. Apart from the issue of why employers would not 
have voluntarily raised wages without the minimum wage if wage increases 
induce such a response, it is not obvious why the response should be greater 
for older workers compared with younger workers. And it is not obvious why 
it should increase the employment of older workers affected by a minimum 
wage increase compared with those not affected, as opposed to possibly 
offsetting any adverse employment effect. 
Employers behaving monopsonistically can also give rise to positive 
employment effects from a minimum wage at least over a range of wage 
increases (Card and Krueger 1995a; Manning 2003; Metcalf 2008). In such 
circumstances, employers are reluctant to raise wages to attract or increase 
the flow of new recruits, since the higher wages would have to be paid to 
their incumbent workers to maintain equity in their internal wage structure. 
The cost of hiring additional workers increases not only by the higher wage 
required to recruit, but also by the upward adjustment to the wages of 
incumbents to maintain internal equity. With a minimum wage, however, 
such employers are no longer inhibited in their hiring by this constraint; 
they have to pay the minimum wage to their incumbent low-wage workers, 
as well as new low-wage recruits. In such circumstances, they may actually 
increase their hiring flows, since the cost of doing so does not increase by 
more than the minimum wage, while prior to the minimum wage, it 
increased by the higher wage required to recruit, as well as the upward 
adjustment to the wages of incumbents to maintain internal equity. A 
monopsony explanation would seem reasonable for a positive employment 
effect, in part because it seems reasonable that employers would be con-
cerned about the implications of raising wages to recruit because of what 
this would do to their internal wage structure. It is not obvious, however, 
why this should apply only to older workers and not to youths. Perhaps 
raising wages to recruit older workers as opposed to younger workers is 
more likely to invite invidious comparisons within the low-wage older inter-
nal workforce of firms. It is also possible that the conditions that give rise 
to monopsony (e.g. restricted mobility, preferences to work for the local 
employer) are more applicable to older workers than younger workers, 
especially for older workers who are working mainly to keep active rather 
than for the pay. 
It is even possible that positive employment effects for older workers have 
been estimated, but they have not been published because of a possible bias 
against publishing results that are statistically insignificant or theoretically 
unexpected. Evidence of such a bias in the minimum wage literature is 
provided in Card and Krueger (1995b). 
The argument that we believe has the most credibility is that increases in 
the employment of older workers could occur if employers substituted away 
from the least productive workers and towards the more productive workers 
when both are subject to a minimum wage increase. In this case, the least 
productive are arguably teenagers (who have few skills and little experience), 
and those more productive are arguably older workers (who have consider-
able experience and may be using these low-wage jobs as a way to supplement 
retirement income or to keep occupied). Older workers may be more qualified 
for the minimum wage jobs than are younger workers, especially because 
many older workers may be working in low-paid jobs to simply bridge their 
transition to retirement and perhaps back from retirement, rather than 
working for the pay. 
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Notes 
1. Reviews of the extensive literature are contained in Brown (1999) and Card 
and Krueger (1995a), Gunderson (2005), Kennan (1995), Neumark and Wascher 
(2007), and OECD (1998), with a review of British evidence on the impact of the 
recent national minimum wage policy in Metcalf (2004). 
2. Variants of the 'at-risk' methodology have been used in Abowd et al. (2000), 
Ashenfelter and Card (1981), Campolieti et al. (2005a,b), Currie and Fallick 
(1996), Linneman (1982), Yuen (2003), and Zavodny (2000). 
3. An issue with all of the minimum wage literature is that of controlling for other 
factors that can influence employment, including shifts in labour supply that, as 
indicated, are occurring for older workers. Unfortunately, direct evidence does not 
exist on the sources of the increased supply of older minimum wage workers. 
Indirect evidence, however, suggests that little of it comes from older workers who 
have a stable employment history in minimum wage jobs (Carrington and Fallick 
2001, Long 1999 and earlier references cited therein). Most of it comes from older 
workers who have returned to work after retiring from higher-paying jobs. Gomez 
and Gunderson (2005: 6), for example, indicate that 23 per cent of retirees in 
Canada return to work, generally in lower-paying jobs compared with the job from 
which they retired. While the supply influx of older workers can go into minimum 
wage jobs, it is not obvious that it would have a differential impact on the treat-
ment groups that experience a minimum wage increase and the range of reasonable 
control groups (discussed subsequently) that are in jobs that pay around the 
minimum wage but that do not experience a minimum wage increase, especially 
after including control variables for other factors that affect employment (which 
was also discussed subsequently). 
4. Statistics Canada restricts access to the master files for confidentiality purposes; 
hence, the actual regression runs were done internally at Statistics Canada. 
5. The recent Canadian studies are Baker (2005), Baker et al. (1999), Campolieti et al. 
(2005a,b), Campolieti et al. (2006) and Yuen (2003). 
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